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REDUCING RACIAL BIAS IN CAPITAL JURY SELECTION BY 
ELIMINATING PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
Kaitlin Bigger 
JD. Candidate, 2018, American University Washington College of Law 
B.A. Political Science, 2013, Appalachian State University 
On May 23, 2016, the Supreme Court 
addressed an area of capital trials continuously 
prone to racial discrimination in its Foster v. 
Chatman1 decision. During voir dire, both 
parties are given peremptory challenges 2 and 
challenges for cause. 3 Challenging a juror for 
cause requires a specific reason for removing 
the juror, while peremptory challenges do 
not. 4 For example, prospective jurors who 
are morally opposed to the death penalty are 
often removed for cause from sitting on a 
murder trial in states where the prosecution is 
allowed to seek the death penalty. Before 
Timothy Foster's capital trial, the prosecution 
used four of its ten peremptory strikes to 
remove all of the prospective black jurors. 5 
During the appeals process, Foster's counsel 
was able to obtain the prosecution's voir dire 
notes. 6 The copies of the jury venire list that 
Foster's counsel obtained had each black 
prospective jurors' name highlighted in bright 
green with an indication at the top that green 
"represent[ed] Blacks." 7 The prosecution also 
turned over a handwritten list of "definite 
NO's" that listed six potential jurors including 
all five qualified black prospective jurors. 8 
Upon review, the Court found that the 
documentation clearly demonstrated racially 
motivated use of peremptory challenges that 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Constitution. 9 
After the Court released its ruling last 
May, critics opined that the facts of Mr. 
Foster's case were so egregious that the ruling 
would have little effect on racism in the 
criminal justice system as a whole. 10 
However, based on the Foster decision, at least 
two murder convictions were vacated and 
remanded by the Supreme Court for further 
review. 11 Regardless of the magnitude of the 
decision's impact, the Foster case is a clear 
example of how the safeguards put in place by 
the Court to guarantee against racial bias in 
jury selection are failing. 12 
To remedy the repeated instances of 
bias, the courts should do away with 
peremptory strikes altogether. 13 Proponents 
of keeping peremptory strikes argue that the 
challenges have "very old credentials." 14 
However, the potential for continued 
discrimination during jury selection outweighs 
any historical significance. Eliminating 
peremptory strikes also poses no risk to 
constitutional guarantee of a fair trial. In fact, 
requiring transparency early on in the trial 
process is essential to combat biases that the 
parties involved may not even be aware that 
they have. 
Limiting voir dire challenges to strikes 
only for cause would require both the 
prosecution and defense to identify their 
reasons for striking the juror. Forcing the 
parties to state an actual reason to justify 
striking a potential juror is likely to ensure that 
racial bias is not the driving force behind the 
challenge. 15 Implicit and explicit racial 
discrimination is a hot topic in current events, 
but the influence that race may have in the 
fair administration of justice is a familiar foe. 
Following Justice Marshall's suggestions in his 
concurring opinion in Batson v. Kentucky 16 and 
eliminating peremptory challenges would be 
one critical step toward much overdue 
equality. 
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